{"id":649,"date":"2026-03-03T14:42:25","date_gmt":"2026-03-03T14:42:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/yachtersworld.com\/?p=649"},"modified":"2026-03-03T14:42:25","modified_gmt":"2026-03-03T14:42:25","slug":"russian-submarines-and-gps-jamming-the-new-reality-for-baltic-cruisers","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/yachtersworld.com\/?p=649","title":{"rendered":"Russian submarines and GPS jamming: The new reality for Baltic cruisers"},"content":{"rendered":"

Russia\u2019s \u2018grey zone\u2019 activity in the Baltic, from GPS interference to aggressive shadowing, is unsettling sailors. Will this be the new normal, asks Elaine Bunting?<\/strong><\/p>\n

\"Submarine
\u201cLook, Gerd… what is that? Is it a boat? Is it moving?\u201d Photo: Buzz Pictures\/Alamy
\n<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u201cLook, Gerd\u2026 what is that? Is it a boat? Is it moving?\u201d<\/p>\n

Anke Schekahn was on watch with her husband, sailing their Mal\u00f6 40 Emaloca from W\u0142adys\u0142awowo in northern Poland, to Klaip\u0117da in Lithuania, on their way to Estonia early in the summer of 2025. In the far distance was the coast of Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave wedged between Poland and Lithuania on the Baltic<\/a> Sea.<\/p>\n

The German couple were transiting through Russia\u2019s Exclusive Economic Zone, but outside the 12-mile territorial limit, when she saw a strange looking silhouette on the horizon.<\/p>\n

Neither of them could make sense of the low, dark object until it came closer. As it approached, they realised it was a partially surfaced submarine. The submarine altered course toward them and closed at an angle, then reduced speed to match the yacht\u2019s. It was close. The conning tower and periscopes looked threatening. Gerd called on the radio, but there was no reply.<\/p>\n

\"\n

Russian naval ships on parade in the Gulf of Finland. Photo: Artem Priakhin\/SOPA Images\/LightRocket\/Getty<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cMy knees started shaking uncontrollably and my mouth was dry. I didn\u2019t dare take a photo. It felt eerie to see no person at all but to know that we were being watched,\u201d Anke wrote on the blog of their Baltic cruise (emaloca-segelt.de) to an Estonian singing festival.<\/p>\n

The couple were now frightened. Were they being monitored, would the submarine pass by, or were they being purposely intimidated?<\/p>\n

They tacked Emaloca away. The submarine followed, then continued on a parallel course. Eventually it crossed their path and continued on its way, but the Schekahns were shaken, cleared well offshore and resolved never to go back. Some time later, they heard a Polish sailor on Ch16 warning about a Russian warship that tried to push him off course.<\/p>\n

For some years Russia has been flexing its might in the Baltic. Many NATO countries are feeling the effects of Russia\u2019s hybrid war and threats to everything from internet stability and energy to transport infrastructure.<\/p>\n

\"A\n

\u2018It felt eerie to know that we were being watched\u2019 Photo: Johner Images\/Alamy<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The Baltic has become a contested zone, with reports of anchor-dragging, suspected sabotage and interference with navigation and communications systems.<\/p>\n

A \u2018shadow\u2019 fleet of mostly Russian-owned tankers flying flags of convenience plies the Baltic and beyond to circumvent sanctions, conduct surveillance and, maybe, to instil uncertainty and fear.<\/p>\n

But it is also one of the most serene and beautiful cruising waters in the world, so how real is the risk, and what can you do to stay safe?<\/p>\n

Baltic cruisers, are you where you think?<\/h2>\n

This is far from the only threat. GPS jamming and spoofing have become everyday and endemic in the eastern Baltic and in other conflict zones, and it has a significant impact on safety of navigation, communications and distress and man overboard equipment.<\/p>\n

In November, Norway\u2019s foreign ministry explicitly warned that Russia is jamming GPS systems, especially in the northern part of the country. \u201cAt our border region, there is almost continuous GPS jamming or spoofing going on, making it hard for civilian traffic \u2013 including, for example, air ambulances,\u201d stated Eivind Vad Petersson, a state secretary in the foreign ministry.<\/p>\n

While the Baltic is the most obvious hot zone, other parts of the world \u2013 such as the eastern Mediterranean near Israel and Gaza \u2013 are also being affected in ways that sailors need to be aware of.<\/p>\n

Jamming floods the GPS frequencies with noise so receivers can\u2019t lock on to real signals.<\/p>\n

\"406MHz\n

For yachtsmen, a modern 406MHz EPIRB is still one of the most dependable pieces of safety gear you can carry.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Spoofing is more insidious: it broadcasts fake GPS data to mislead ships, aircraft, or vehicles into thinking they are somewhere else. Both can disrupt navigation and critical systems that depend on precise location data. That includes satellite communications systems, which lock onto a specific satellite using precise frequencies and timing.<\/p>\n

Spoofing or jamming can also seriously undermine emergency beacons because those devices rely on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, such as GPS, Galileo and GLONASS, to figure out where they are before they send a distress signal. If the GPS feed is wrong or unavailable, a distress system or PLB can transmit coordinates that are inaccurate, miles off, or completely missing.<\/p>\n

\"The\n

The Schekahns enjoying a more typically peaceful Baltic mooring spot in Finland\u2019s Turku archipelago, tying up bow-to with their Mal\u00f8 40. Photo: Gerd & Anjke Schekahn<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cIn effect, GNSS and AIS are under cyberattack in these regions and, from a safety point of view, you don\u2019t want to rely on signals we know are being messed with,\u201d says Ramsey Faragher, president of the Royal Institute of Navigation. \u201cYou need to understand thoroughly how your own safety of life systems work as there are man overboard and PLB devices<\/a> based entirely on GPS receivers.\u201d<\/p>\n

The extent of jamming, spoofing and denial is recorded on a daily basis and you can view incidences of it worldwide and go back through time on websites such as GPSwise.aero<\/a> and gpsjam.org<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThis is generated by data from aircraft flying overhead, but people are working on adding AIS data from ships to get a richer map,\u201d notes Faragher. This problem, he says, \u201cis never going to go away now, it is the new normal. It is cheap and effective in the age of people using drones.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"The\n

The website gpswise.aero shows a worldwide map where GPS spoofing and jamming has been detected by civil aircraft. Photo: gpswise.aero<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Jamming the jammers<\/h2>\n

Faking GPS signals isn\u2019t technically hard, Faragher explains: the genuine GPS signal of 50W coming from satellites 20,000km away is so small that a transmitter on the ground pushing out just a couple of watts can overpower it locally and create a bubble of false or distorted positioning.<\/p>\n

\u201cThere are many ways to interfere with GPS, and the closest thing we have to a reliable countermeasure is a special type of antenna called a CRPA (Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna), which is roughly the size of a dinner plate; it\u2019s heavy and expensive,\u201d he notes.<\/p>\n

CRPA uses multiple antenna elements plus digital beam-steering electronics and signal-processing hardware to sense the direction incoming signals are coming from and filter out any arriving from suspicious or impossible angles. They are one of the few practical defences.<\/p>\n

\"A\n

A GPS jamming drone being tested by German authorities as a defence against incursion around airports by other \u2018unfriendly\u2019 drones. Photo: Jan Woitas\/dpa\/Alamy<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The technology is tightly linked to defence navigation, so US-made systems are treated as controlled items under International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). However, lower-end anti-jam or GNSS \u2018interference-resistant\u2019 devices are being developed that sit outside ITAR rules, though they are substantially more expensive than regular GPS antennas at roughly \u00a31,100-\u00a31,200.<\/p>\n

\u201cBut it is more open, and we will be seeing more of these on airlines in the future and big maritime vessels because it is one of the lines of defence,\u201d says Faragher.<\/p>\n

Alternative systems are also being reintroduced, most notably Loran. The system dates back to the early 1940s and used low-frequency radio transmitters on land to give position fixes based on timing differences between stations. GPS killed off Loran, and it was shut down in the US and UK over a decade ago, but its resistance to jamming has kindled into life a new-generation high-accuracy enhanced system, or eLoran.<\/p>\n

\"Finns\n

Finns Niklas and Johanna W\u00e4rnhjelm sail the Baltic and consider it to still be very safe. Photo: Niklas & Johanna W\u00e4rnhjelm<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

It is considered so vital that, in November 2025, the UK government announced it was allocating \u00a371 million of a \u00a3155 million resilience funding package to the development of a national eLoran programme, and \u00a313 million to a GNSS interference-monitoring system. According to Faragher: \u201ceLoran is already in use in South Korea and China, and some other countries have had it as an alternative for a while, and we are looking at rebuilding our capabilities.\u201d<\/p>\n

There are other systems that can overcome GPS fragility too, such as Radar Terrain-Referencing, where a vessel\u2019s radar image is automatically compared to a digital chart or coastline database to confirm the vessel\u2019s position. Some modern radars can overlay the radar picture directly onto an ENC chart in ECDIS.<\/p>\n

And of course there is \u201cdead reckoning and figuring out where you are the old-fashioned way,\u201d notes Faragher.<\/p>\n

\"The\n

The rocky coastline of islets and islands in the western Baltic\u2019s Stockholm Archipelago is a bucket list destination for many for sailors. Photo: Light-Studio\/Shutterstock<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cBut the challenges are these integrated systems you can\u2019t manually fix, such as your satcoms; those issues remain,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n

\u201cVarious people are putting out guidance on what mariners can do, and our report [the Royal Institute of Navigation is due to issue a report at the end of 2025] will include a guidance document on what to do and how to prepare and recover. For example, it is very important to fully reboot your GPS receiver if it has been exposed to spoofing,\u201d he says, explaining that you can\u2019t assume anything it has cached is trustworthy.<\/p>\n

\u201cWe would emphasise the aspect of being very conscious of which technologies are used in your equipment and replacing them or very carefully assessing using these online maps to be confident you are not going into an affected area,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n

\"Aerial\n

Photo: Johner Images\/Alamy<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Things are not as they seem<\/h2>\n

To return to the experience of Anke and Gerd Schekahn, the region around Kaliningrad continues to be highly unstable. Kaliningrad is not connected to mainland Russia, but as a strategic enclave on the coast it is home to Russia\u2019s Baltic Fleet, air-defence systems, electronic warfare units and (reportedly) nuclear missiles.<\/p>\n

Russia regards it as a forward military base and a pressure point where they could cut or squeeze supply chains to NATO\u2019s Baltic states. Aggression has been spilling out to sea from this area.<\/p>\n

Friederich Haas is managing director of AKE Skabe, a risk, security, and crisis-management consultancy.<\/p>\n

He served in the German Air Force in the 1990s then did Eastern European studies with law, history and politics at the very time that, he says: \u201chistory was unfolding in front of our eyes in Poland, Russia and Ukraine.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"German\n

German couple Gerd and Anke Schekahn were frightened by their close encounter with a Russian submarine and avoided the waters around the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on their return passage across the Baltic. Photo: Gerd & Anjke Schekah<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Today, AKE Skabe works with companies, NGOs and media operating in hostile environments. \u201cThere are not many points where I would agree with Mr Putin, but he\u2019s right that we have been in a different war since the mid-2010s. Since the war in Crimea and the Donbas, hybrid warfare has been going on,\u201d Haas says.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Nord Stream [pipeline explosion in 2022] has raised some questions regarding Ukraine but for a long time Russia was checking out how they would control the Baltic Sea. Today, with drones in the battlefield you cannot really hide anywhere, but at sea there are still some quite nice places to hide.<\/p>\n

\u201cThe Russians have bought ships with sonars and try to understand who is coming along based on the special sound every ship makes, so somewhere in the deep sea you put an underwater drone and when the sound signature comes along you give the drone the command and target it.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"Gerd\n

Gerd Schekahn. Photo: Gerd & Anjke Schekahn<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The Russian \u2018ghost ship\u2019 fleet also poses risks. \u201cThe \u2018shadow\u2019 fleet was created because of all the sanctions,\u201d Haas says. \u201cThey bought and hired a lot of ships \u2013 we are definitely talking about more than 100 \u2013 uninsured, but with crews and owners paid nicely, and they bring oil and other goods in. They switch off the normal ID systems so you have to be aware, for example on foggy days, that there are many more vessels out there than you think.\u201d<\/p>\n

He cites the example of a German Navy ship that approached a Russian scientific vessel only to find people on board who were obviously armed. \u201cA civil ship might be a covert operation by Russian special forces.<\/p>\n

\"Gerd\n

Gerd and Anke Schekahn were sailing from northern Poland to Estonia when shadowed by a Russian submarine. Photo: Gerd & Anjke Schekah<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cWhen you sail near military ships you will respect them, but you might not know the ship anchoring out there has Russian special forces on board until you come close to them and they show you their weapons. And you might disturb people who don\u2019t want any witnesses. There is growing uncertainty about what is going on,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n

\u201cIn the past, you could sail from Rostock to Riga without a problem, but now if you cross some waters the Russians claim to be theirs it could be difficult. You might get into territories you don\u2019t mean to get into and it\u2019s simply a risk.<\/p>\n

\u201cYou could be arrested on a pretext and find yourself in a Russian prison when you haven\u2019t done anything. We have seen that in the past in geopolitical conflicts where they arrest citizens who haven\u2019t done anything, take them hostage and create a narrative.\u201d<\/p>\n

This applies to other areas around the world as well. Haas\u2019s advice is: \u201cHave a security plan of how you are going to handle certain situations and make your crew aware of it. Make sure they know what to do. With clients we do a little role play, a table top exercise. It\u2019s like the training you would do for crossing the Atlantic, so that in the real situation you react by instinct.<\/p>\n

\"The\n

The Russian Naval Cathedral of Saint Nicholas on Kotlin Island in the approaches to St Petersburg in the eastern Baltic. Photo: Linda Steward\/Getty<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\u201cSo you could practice a type of drill where everyone knows what their role is, because a Russian or a NATO patrol boat crew can also be very nervous and may be wondering if this is really a civilian [yacht] or a Russian boat undercover.<\/p>\n

\u201cDo we have the passports in one place so we don\u2019t have to search around for them? How do we handle being checked or [rummaged]? How to de-escalate their nervousness, avoid making any sudden, quick movements and remain cool?<\/p>\n

\u201cYou have to do some careful planning and sit down and analyse the risk. We have to respect the political risks just like we would the weather or avoiding a storm.\u201d<\/p>\n

Article continues below\u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

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How to go cruising in the Baltic this winter<\/a><\/h2>\n<\/header>\n
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Sailing in the Baltic is increasingly popular, and for all the right reasons: beautiful cruising grounds, lovely weather, interesting history\u2026<\/p>\n<\/div>\n